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THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE AS AN ANTECEDENT OF EFFECTIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Brooke Stanley, Winthrop University 
Steven A. Frankforter, Winthrop University 
Bret Becton, University of Southern Mississippi 
 
In this paper, we examine a possible antecedent to board effectiveness – the presence of a nominating committee.  We 
argue that director cooptation by CEOs, and therefore ineffectual governance, may result from allowing CEOs to appoint 
sympathetic directors. Thus, because outside independent board members are more likely to be effective in their roles as 
monitors of the CEO, and because such members are more likely to have been selected by nominating committees, 
measures of board effectiveness should be positively associated with the presence of a nominating committee.  Our results 
are largely consistent with our hypotheses, and are thus instructive in the design of optimal governance mechanisms.  We 
find that firm profitability, frequency of compensation committee meetings, compensation committee size, and CEO 
experience of compensation committee members are all higher among firms with nominating committees.   
 
Despite the abundance of research on corporate boards 
of directors in general, there is little research on board 
committees in particular.  Some of the most important 
decisions made by corporate boards are made by these 
committees, especially the nominating and compensation 
committees, rather than the board at large.  Board 
committees are among the most important mechanisms to 
facilitate director decision-making (Singh & Harianto, 
1989).  It is largely through the actions of the committees 
that the board can attempt to provide incentives to maximize 
managerial effort and minimize executive opportunism.  
However, CEOs may circumvent board control through their 
involvement in the director selection process.   
Perhaps it is because the media and investors are 
concerned about executive compensation plans that they see 
as excessive, that there are a few papers that study the role of 
the compensation committee.  The extant literature includes 
the work of Conyon and Peck (1998), who found executive 
compensation is more closely aligned with performance at 
firms with compensation committees dominated by outside 
directors.  Conyon and He (2004) found the level and type of 
compensation granted to the CEO varies depending on the 
composition of the compensation committee, in a way 
consistent with the predictions of agency theory.  Finally, 
evidence from Vafeas (2003) showed that regulatory reforms 
regarding compensation committee membership helped to 
reduce CEO opportunism in setting pay.   
There is, however, almost no literature on the board’s 
other key committee, the nominating committee.  Although 
one of the board’s most important responsibilities is to 
monitor the CEO, few board tasks are as crucial to the 
successful achievement of this goal as deciding which 
individuals merit director status.  We believe that 
nominating committees are central to effective corporate 
governance because this committee can serve to screen for 
qualified and independent board nominees.  Absent a 
nominating committee, new board members are typically 
recommended by an existing board member, who may even 
be the CEO that the board is responsible for monitoring.  
Alternatively, directors at firms with nominating committees 
may be more likely to be independent and may be more 
likely to objectively monitor the CEO, and to mitigate 
agency problems that result from the separation of 
ownership and control.  Vafeas (1999) found that 
nominating committees are often comprised of directors who 
are most likely to act independently and in the shareholders’ 
interests.  Similarly, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) found 
that firms with nominating committees appoint more 
independent outside directors and have fewer directors with 
conflicts of interest.   
When a company lacks a nominating committee, it 
permits the direct involvement of the CEO in board 
decisions regarding director selection and recruitment, as 
well as subsequent director assignments to committees and 
the organization of activities by those committees.  We 
argue that a CEO’s involvement in director nominations may 
ultimately be manifested in the functioning of the 
compensation committee, since this would allow the CEO to 
influence the terms of his/her compensation.   
 
HYPOTHESES 
We expect that when firms lack nominating committees, 
it is a reflection of agency problems within the firm, which 
may also manifest themselves in other ways (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  According to managerial power theory, there 
are numerous reasons for boards and their committees to 
cooperate with CEOs in ways that are not in the best interest 
of the shareholders, most notably in the form of a sub-
optimal compensation contract (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004).  
Directors may be inclined to agree to such contracts to win 
reelection to the board, garner higher compensation for their 
board service, or attempting to preserve the friendly nature 
of their relationship with the CEO.  One possible 
explanation for this may be the lack of a nominating 
committee.  Without a nominating committee, it may 
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become easier for CEOs to exert power over the board.  This 
may lead to increased influence with regard to the design of 
his/her compensation arrangements so that his/her self-
interest is maximized, instead of firm value.  Therefore, 
agency problems that boards are expected to mitigate will 
instead be exacerbated at firms without nominating 
committees. 
 
CEO Share Ownership 
When executives have little equity at stake in their 
company, they have a diminished interest in promoting 
shareholder wealth, and can be expected to be more self-
serving (Malatesta & Walkling, 1988).  As CEO stock 
ownership increases, there will be greater degrees of 
alignment with the interests of the firm and its shareholders 
(Eisenhardt, 1988; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  When CEOs 
hold substantial equity in their firms, risk and reward 
perceptions are explicitly linked with those of shareholders, 
making CEOs more likely to behave in shareholders’ 
interests (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003).  
Greater CEO share ownership more closely aligns CEO 
interests with those of shareholders, thus reducing the kind 
of agency problems that require monitoring by the board of 
directors.  Therefore CEOs who are not prone to agency 
problems are less likely to appoint sympathetic directors 
over whom they can exert their power, making nominating 
committees less necessary.  In other words, CEO share 
ownership and nominating committees can act as substitutes 
to mitigate agency problems.   
 
Hypothesis 1: CEO share ownership will be 
negatively associated with the presence of a 
nominating committee. 
 
Firm Profitability 
Firm profitability is known to be related to governance 
structure (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003).  The directors 
of underperforming firms tend to exercise their power and 
authority more readily, holding management to higher 
standards of accountability (Alderfer, 1986; Mizruchi, 
1983).  We expect that profitable firms are those governed 
by independent outside directors who effectively monitor the 
CEO, and who successfully provide incentives to maximize 
managerial effort and minimize executive opportunism.  
Therefore, we predict that such directors are most likely 
appointed by firms with nominating committees (Shivdasani 
& Yermack, 1999).  
 
Hypothesis 2: Firm profitability will be positively 
associated with the presence of a nominating 
committee. 
 
CEO Compensation 
Agency theory predicts that when monitoring is weak, 
as when a firm lacks an independent nominating committee 
to select directors, CEO compensation will increase (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983).  Otherwise, the board as a whole, 
invariably including the CEO, will evaluate candidates for 
directorship.  Excessive executive compensation has been 
linked to managerial entrenchment and domination over 
directors (Borokhovich, Brunarski, & Parrino, 1997) and 
interlocking boards (Hallock, 1997).  When a firm faces 
significant external control because of the presence of a 
large external block owner of shares, CEO compensation 
diminishes (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995).  Additionally, 
several studies have cast doubt on the relationship of 
executive pay and firm performance (Deckop, 1988; 
Murphy, 1985).  In sum, high CEO compensation may 
indicate weak board oversight and heightened CEO 
influence over the compensation committee.   
 
Hypothesis 3: Total CEO compensation will be 
negatively associated with the presence of a 
nominating committee. 
 
Number of Compensation Committee Meetings 
If unconstrained by the presence of a nominating 
committee, a CEO may succeed in influencing board 
nominations to favor individuals who are less likely to 
constrain managerial autonomy (Fleischer, Hazard, & 
Klipper, 1988).  A key safeguard to board independence is to 
hold more meetings.  Meetings represent the fundamental 
prerequisite for collaboration (McGrath, 1991), which can 
have a significant impact on the performance of teams such 
as boards of directors and their committees.  Meetings 
provide executives and directors with the opportunity to 
share information, and more frequent meetings facilitate 
better communication between these parties (Shivdasani & 
Zenner, 2004).  Increased board or committee meetings also 
allow more time for directors/members to more actively 
monitor management (Evans, Evans, & Loh, 2002).  For 
example, audit committees that meet more frequently are 
more likely to be better informed and more diligent in 
carrying out their duties (Abbott, Parker, Peters, & 
Raghunandan, 2003; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006).  
Finally, some researchers suggest that the number of 
meetings in a year reveals the diligence of a board or 
committee (Persons, 2006; Raghunandan & Rama, 2007) 
and that increasing committee meeting time is key to 
improving the effectiveness of boards and committees 
(Conger, Finegold, & Lawler, 1998). 
In addition, several studies document a relation between 
meeting frequency and firm performance.  Miller & Norburn 
(1986) found that the frequency of board meetings is related 
to the board’s ability to make decisions, and to company 
performance.  Zahara and Pearce (1989) concluded that the 
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amount of interaction the board has with the CEO also 
affects firm performance.  Similarly, Vafeas (1999) found 
that the frequency of board meetings is related to firm value, 
suggesting it is an important feature of board function. 
In summary, a higher frequency of committee meetings 
reflects increased monitoring of the CEO by the board and 
may result in better overall governance of the firm.  We 
consider meetings of the compensation committee in 
particular, because we believe that if the CEO has power 
over the board, this is most likely to manifest itself in the 
functioning of this committee, since this would enable a self-
interested CEO to influence his own pay.  And because 
nominating committees are more likely to nominate 
independent outside directors, and such directors are more 
likely to monitor the CEO rather than rubber-stamp his/her 
decisions, we believe that nominating committees are more 
likely to be found in firms whose compensation committee 
meets more frequently.   
 
Hypothesis 4: The number of a firm’s 
compensation committee meetings will be 
positively associated with the presence of a 
nominating committee. 
 
Compensation Committee Size 
Much empirical evidence suggests that small group size 
may facilitate the manipulation of a board or committee by 
the CEO for his own personal gain.  Several studies suggest 
that smaller groups tend to be more cooperative and thus 
more susceptible to tit-for-tat strategies.  There is ample 
evidence in the social dilemma research that cooperation 
declines as group size increases (Allison, McQueen, & 
Schaerfl, 1992; Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992; Messick 
& Brewer, 1983; Seijts & Latham, 2000).  Evidence also 
suggests that larger groups may be more effective at creating 
an opportunity for dialogue (Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, 
Nagao, & Hinsz, 1990) and more likely to consider minority 
points of view (Tindale, Smith, Thomas, Filkins, & Sheffey, 
1996).  Furthermore, numerous researchers have 
demonstrated that cohesion decreases as group size increases 
(Bantel & Finkelstein, 1991; Halebian & Finkelstein, 1991; 
Hoffman & Maier, 1961; Katz; 1949; Wiersema & Bantel; 
1992).  Additionally, organization theory literature suggests 
that larger groups and organizations experience dynamic 
tension due to the challenges related to coordination and 
cooperation among more people.  As a result, as 
organizations or groups grow in size, they tend to become 
more control-oriented (Mintzberg, 1979) using more formal 
rules, regulations and processes than smaller organizations 
or groups (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Smith, Smith, Olian, 
Sims, O’Bannon, & Scully, 1994).   
This size of boards and committees has also been the 
subject of much research.  There is evidence in the existing 
literature to suggest that larger boards or committees are 
more difficult for the CEO to control.  For example, 
researchers have suggested that group size is important 
because as size increases, so does the potential for 
dissimilarity (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  As dissimilarity 
increases, so does the diversity of perspectives and input, 
making tit-for-tat strategies less likely.  Zahara and Pearce 
(1989) suggest that larger boards are more likely to be 
heterogeneous in their industry experience and expertise, 
which can improve the strategic direction of the firm.  
Furthermore, as group size increases, group cohesion and 
communication intensity become strained (Shaw, 1976).  
Therefore, larger boards may not be as susceptible to 
management domination as small boards (Davidson, Pilger, 
& Szakmary, 1998).  CEO domination of boards becomes 
more difficult with larger boards because they are more 
likely to resist managerial domination (Rosenstein, 1987).  
In sum, this body of literature suggests that because of the 
increased potential for homogeneity, group cohesion, and 
intense communication, smaller compensation committees 
are more likely to accept the status quo and yield to the 
demands of the CEO.   
To reiterate an earlier point, we believe that board 
cooptation by the CEO is most likely to manifest itself in the 
functioning of the compensation committee in particular, 
and so we examine the size of this committee as it relates to 
the presence of a nominating committee.  Based on the 
extant research regarding group size, we argue that larger 
compensation committees are less prone to being controlled 
by the CEO.  That a compensation committee is independent 
in its decision-making instead of cooperating with the CEO 
suggests that its members were appointed to the board by a 
nominating committee rather than by the CEO himself.   
 
Hypothesis 5: The size of a firm’s compensation 
committee will be positively associated with the 
presence a nominating committee.   
 
CEO Experience of Compensation Committee Members 
Experience, especially executive experience, plays an 
important role in decision-making in organizations.  The 
effects of executive experience have been examined in 
numerous contexts.  Several studies have examined CEO 
experience and its effect on firm strategies (Chaganti & 
Sambharya; 1987; Govindarajan, 1989; Geletkancyz, & 
Black, 2001; Hambrick, Geletkancyz, & Fredrickson, 1993; 
Miller, 1991; Smith & White, 1987; Thomas, Litschert, & 
Ramaswamy, 1991).  Although this body of research 
concerns how CEO experience affects CEO decision-
making, it also has implications for how CEO experience 
affects the decision making of CEOs when they serve on 
compensation committees. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that important 
organizational outcomes would reflect characteristics of 
firms' "upper echelons" (top managers).  If executive’s 
backgrounds affect organizations as upper echelon theory 
proposes, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the CEO 
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experience of compensation committee members has some 
type of effect on the functioning of the committee.  We 
believe that more experience as a CEO among compensation 
committee members will result in increased vigilance as a 
compensation committee member.  Several studies provide 
evidence that boards with more experience tend to be more 
attentive.  Factors such as education, job status, and 
experience have been shown to be related to organizational 
voice such that higher levels of the former are related to 
higher levels of the latter.   
Qualifications such as education and experience provide 
members with more general knowledge resulting in a greater 
ability to recognize problems or opportunities and to offer a 
greater number of potential solutions (LePine & Van Dyne, 
1998).  This also results in greater confidence in one’s 
ability to make suggestions at work making it more likely 
that members will express concerns, make suggestions for 
improvement, etc. (Farr & Ford, 1990).  Furthermore, job 
status provides access to information and freedom regarding 
one’s behavior on the job.  More status equates to more 
information, more latitude to challenge the status quo, and a 
greater sense of responsibility for outcomes (LePine & Van 
Dyne, 1998).   
Taken together this literature suggests that directors 
with more CEO experience will be more effective in their 
roles as monitors of a CEO.  Due to the importance of the 
compensation committee in particular, we consider the CEO 
experience of its members.  We propose that higher CEO 
experience among compensation committee members is 
associated with increased vigilance and effectiveness, which 
should follow from these board members having been 
selected by a nominating committee.   
 
Hypothesis 6: The CEO experience of 
compensation committee members will be 
positively associated with the presence of a 
nominating committee. 
 
METHOD 
Design 
We randomly selected 100 publicly-listed firms that 
possessed nominating committees.  Next, we selected 
control group firms in the same industry that lacked 
nominating committees.  We employed case-control 
procedures described by Seabright, Levinthal, and Fichman 
(1992).  Case-control designs are suited to studying events 
that are relatively rare in occurrence.  Firm size was selected 
as a matching variable because it could potentially confound 
results.  We obtained a matching of control group firms 
within 2-digit SICs, stratifying controls on the basis of total 
assets and selecting firms lacking nominating committees 
that were nearest in total assets within the same 2-digit SICs 
to each in the experimental group (Singh & Harianto, 1989).  
This resulted in a total of 200 firms to be examined in our 
study.  Before we analyzed data in a multivariate model, we 
first performed a t-test to determine whether asset size 
differed between the groups and found an insignificant t-
statistic of .03.  Thus, we were assured that the companies 
remaining in our study were of similar size.  We selected 
2000 as the examination year because the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 led to widespread changes in 
board structures and processes that would likely obscure our 
investigation.  
 
Measures and Analysis 
The dependent variable was whether a firm employed a 
nominating committee, coded 1 or 0.  The independent 
variables included compensation committee, CEO, and firm 
performance factors.  We identified three compensation 
committee variables; the number of times it met, its size, and 
the proportion of its members with CEO experience.  Next, 
we included two CEO variables; total CEO compensation 
and the proportion of the firm‘s shares he/she owned.  
Lastly, return on equity was selected as the firm 
performance variable. 
We introduced three control variables; duality, the 
proportion of shares held by five percent owners, and firm 
size (log of employees).  Duality occurs when the CEO also 
serves as chairman of the board.  With such positioning 
he/she may buffer or limit the amount of control a board 
might impose on management (Donaldson & Davis, 1989, 
1991; Williamson, 1985).  Duality has been linked to board 
independence (Chatterjee, Harrison, & Bergh, 2003) and to 
firm profitability (Donaldson & Davis, 1991: Frankforter, 
Davis, & Vollrath, 2001).  Duality is a dichotomous variable 
in which 0 represents outside board leadership, known as the 
independent governance structure, and 1 represents instances 
where the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board.   
Diffused shareholders may have reduced incentives to 
monitor management and thus, characterize management-
controlled firms (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995).  
Shareholders possessing significant equity holdings above 
the five percent threshold that requires a section 13(d) filing 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission often have 
significant influence because the benefits of their 
involvement in monitoring a company’s management 
outweigh the costs (Demsetz, 1983).  These large-block 
owners have material influence over corporate policy 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), board composition (Pound, 1992), 
and help to ensure the firm’s executives and officers act to 
further the interests of shareholders (Bethel & Liebeskind, 
1993).  The greater combined holdings of five percent 
owners, the greater their ability to monitor the firm, thus, 
curbing agency issues (Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988).  
We measured the total percentage of common stock held by 
five percent owners. 
Firm size may influence the form of power and 
governance structures.  For example, Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni (1994) reported that organization size tended to 
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affect the use of dual structures, the power of its executives, 
and firm performance.  We controlled for firm size by 
computing the log of the total number of employees 
(Frankforter et al., 2001).   
We obtained total CEO compensation data from 
ExecuComp.  Total CEO compensation included the sum of 
salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of 
restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted, 
long-term incentive payouts, and all other total 
compensation.  We computed and used the log of total CEO 
compensation to control for nonlinear data.  Firm size and 
return on equity were obtained from Research Insight.  All 
other data were indentified from an examination of proxy 
statements.  We employed hierarchical logistic regression 
analysis to test our model and used one-tailed tests because 
our hypotheses predict direction.  The model is described 
below: 
 
The adoption of a nominating committee by a corporation 
(no = 0; yes = 1) is a function of:  
 
A) the following control variables: 
1. presence of a dual governance structure 
2. The proportion of shares held by five-percent 
owners 
3. firm size (log of employees) 
 
as well as: 
 
B) the following experimental variables: 
1. the number of compensation committee meetings 
2. the side of the compensation committee 
3. the proportion of compensation committee 
members with experience as a CEO at another 
company 
4. total CEO compensation 
5. the proportion of the firm‘s shares the CEO owned 
6. the firm’s return on equity 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics, variation inflation 
factors, and the correlation matrix.  We addressed 
muticollinearity concerns by examining correlations and 
variation inflation factors.  No correlation coefficient 
exceeded .36.  Additionally, none of the variation inflation 
factors surpassed 1.30, far from the critical limit of 10 
(Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989).  These results 
supported our conclusion that muticollinearity did not 
threaten to contaminate our results. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Variation Inflation Factors (VIFs), and the Correlation Matrix 
 
     * p < .05 
   ** p < .01 
 *** p < .001 
 Mean S.D. VIF 1 2 3 4 
1. Nominating 
committee .50 .50 --- ---    
2. Duality .65 .48 1.104 .002 ---   
3. Five percent 
ownership 24.13 16.08 1.164 -.028 .065 ---  
4. Firm size .64 .67 1.141 .211** .057 .039 --- 
5. Committee 
meetings 3.52 2.55 1.145 .255*** -.145* -.110 .101 
6. Committee size 3.10 .94 1.161 .298*** .123 .027 .258*** 
7. CEO experience .54 .50 1.064 .126 -.023 .050 .163* 
8. CEO ownership .04 .07 1.284 -.176* .161* .351*** -.022 
9. CEO 
compensation 3.46 .62 1.144 .123 .124 -.105 .118 
10. Return on equity 11.38 15.81 1.091 .140* .082 .017 .121 
        
        
5. Committee 
meetings ---       
6. Committee size .145* ---      
7. CEO experience .053 .003 ---     
8. CEO ownership -.246*** -.123 -.092 ---    
9. CEO 
compensation .179** -.053 -.011 -.106 ---   
10. Return on equity .005 .072 -.118 .185** ---   
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Results 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Beta Beta 
Constant -.431 -4.166 
(Standard Error) (.343) (1.265) 
Duality -.040 .006 
 (.306) (.348) 
Five percent ownership -.005 .003 
 (.009) (.010) 
Firm size .663* .297 
 (.225) (.252) 
Committee meetings  .181** 
  (.075) 
Committee size  .637*** 
  (.204) 
CEO experience  .543* 
  (.328) 
CEO ownership  -4.664 
  (3.692) 
CEO compensation  .230 
  (.270) 
Return on equity  .019* 
  (.011) 
   
   
-2 log-likelihood 266.899 234.031 
Cox and Snell R2 .046 .190 
Nagelkerke R2 .061 .254 
chi-square                                9.380 42.247 
Percent correctly classified 60.0 67.5 
n 200 200 
df 3 9 
     * p < .05 
   ** p < .01 
 *** p < .001 
  
Table 2 displays the logistic regression results.  Model 1 
reports the results for the control variables with a 
Nagelkerke R2 of .061.  Model 2 adds the six experimental 
variables to the equation.  The Nagelkerke R2 for this model 
is .254, with a substantial increment in the multiple squared 
correlation coefficient (ΔR2 = .193).  Model 2 reveals 
significant main effects for the number of compensation 
committee meetings, compensation committee size, CEO 
experience of compensation committee members, and return 
on equity.  Greater numbers of compensation committee 
meetings, larger compensation committee size, greater CEO 
experience of compensation committee members, and 
increased firm return on equity were associated with the 
presence of nominating committees.  However, the main 
effects for CEO ownership and CEO compensation were not 
significant.  In summary, hypotheses 2, 4, 5 and 6 were 
supported. 
With the proliferation of committees in corporate 
governance structures, our results suggest that increased 
attention may be warranted regarding the presence of certain 
committees and how committees are organized.  This study 
reveals evidence supporting a contention that firms 
possessing nominating committees are typified by a more 
active board and improved financial performance. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Although agency theory has been one of the most 
dominant management theories over the past few decades, 
empirical tests of its predictions often produce mixed and 
confusing results.  For example, Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
concluded that agency theory was an empirically valid 
perspective.  Other research suggests, however, that agency 
theory has little explanatory or predictive power.  Dalton et 
al. (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of empirical 
ownership-performance studies and found few examples of 
systemic relationships and little support for agency theory.  
In contrast to the objections of these studies, we find 
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significant results suggesting that agency problems do arise.  
Improving our understanding how they might be mitigated 
or exacerbated may lead to improved governance standards 
and practices.   
We begin with the observation that there is a dearth of 
extant literature regarding the existence and structure of 
board committees.  This study contributes to our 
understanding of corporate governance by examining a 
possible antecedent to board effectiveness – the presence of 
a nominating committee.  We argue that because outside 
independent board members are more likely to be effective 
in their roles as monitors of the CEO, and because such 
members are more likely to have been appointed by 
nominating committees, measures of board effectiveness 
should be positively associated with the presence of a 
nominating committee.  Our results are largely consistent 
with our hypotheses, and are thus instructive in designing 
guidelines for firms to improve the efficacy of their boards.   
Director cooptation by the CEO, and therefore an 
ineffective board, may be most readily be achieved by 
allowing CEO involvement in board nominations.  The 
results of this study suggest that four measures of board 
effectiveness are associated with the presence of a 
nominating committee.  First, we find that firm profitability 
is positively associated with the presence of a nominating 
committee.  This suggests that the nominating committee 
serves as a vital tool to ensure effective monitoring of the 
CEO by the board of directors to reduce the possibility of 
agency problems.  Nominating committees reduce the 
amount of influence a CEO has over board composition and 
activities, thus increasing the amount of autonomy the board 
has in monitoring CEO activities and performance, which 
may reduce opportunistic behavior by a CEO.   
Second, the results indicate that compensation 
committees at firms with nominating committees tend to 
meet more frequently.  As discussed earlier, the number of 
meetings has been shown to be associated with numerous 
conditions necessary for effective corporate governance such 
as collaboration, communication, goal commitment, 
monitoring, informedness, and vigilance.  Thus it appears 
that greater frequency of compensation committees meetings 
reflects improved governance that follows from directors 
being selected by a nominating committee rather than 
appointed by the CEO or another self-interested insider. 
Third, the results indicate that firms with larger 
compensation committees tend to have nominating 
committees.  We believe that one possible explanation for 
this is that it may be easier for CEOs to manipulate and 
control smaller committees.  Smaller compensation 
committees may be symptomatic of director cooptation and 
ineffectiveness.    
Finally, we find that CEO experience of compensation 
committee members is higher at firms with nominating 
committees.  The extant literature suggests that greater 
executive experience results in increased vigilance and 
effectiveness as a director.  Thus greater CEO experience 
among compensation committee members is indicative of an 
independent committee that seeks to design an optimal 
compensation contract rather than cooperate with the CEO.  
This suggests that compensation committee members are 
more effective when they are selected by nominating 
committees instead of appointed by CEOs.   
We conclude from these results that the presence of a 
nominating committee is a critical factor in the design of 
effective corporate governance mechanisms, and believe the 
findings of our study are important and informative to both 
researchers and practitioners.  Although there is no shortage 
of guidance on how to improve board governance and 
mitigate executive opportunism, we feel that this study 
makes a significant and needed contribution by highlighting 
the importance of nominating committees in accomplishing 
these tasks.  Most notably, practitioners would do well to 
ensure that their firms form nominating committees in order 
to ensure that appropriate directors are chosen, thereby 
increasing the efficacy of the board at large in its 
responsibility of monitoring management.  It should be 
noted that the 2003 decision by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to require all NYSE-listed companies to adopt 
nominating committees is consistent with the findings of this 
study.  However, in light of our findings, its decision to 
exclude NASDAQ-listed firms from the same requirement 
should be revisited.   
One limitation of this study is its examination of pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance conditions.  Thus, we 
excluded evaluation of many of the independence-promoting 
facets that led to greater director autonomy vis-à-vis CEOs.  
However, we believe this approach to be appropriate so that 
it can distinguish between pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
corporate governance conditions and effects.  
Future research on nominating committees should 
center on the details of how nominating committees 
function.  Specifically, a greater understanding is needed of 
how they identify individuals who merit director status and 
how they resolve internal conflicts when multiple candidates 
are identified.  In addition, future research should consider 
the evolution of the bargaining game between the CEO and 
shareholders, and whether or not the nominating committee 
can help to ensure that the balance of power remains in the 
hands of the board.  Finally, the literature should examine 
the interactions of the board’s various committees, and 
whether there are a select few directors who serve on the 
board’s most important committees, such as the 
compensation and nominating committees. 
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